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Reaffirming Human Dignity in Disputes 
Over Children Born From Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies 
by 
Mr. Adam E. Frey 
The lIwhor is lltr;s Ductor Cml(lidate. Art' Maria Sellool oj Ul\\'. 
1. lnlroduction 
In 1998. a California appeals COUl1 made an astonishing ru ling: the legal 
parents of a chi ld engineered by the cOlltributions of li ve people were a 
couple with no genetic relati on to her. including a "father" who had no 
des ire to rai se her. III re 811::'(111(,(/1 o ri ginated when John and Luanne 
Buzzanca. an infertile coupl e. contracted with a sun'ogate. Pame la Snel l. to 
carry and birth a child conceived from anonymous gamete donations . 
lit igution began after the Buzzanca's marria£c broke down. with John 
divorcing Luanne one month before the chi ld. Jaycee. was born. John 
attempted to avoid child suppon . arguing that Jnycee was not a child of the 
marriage. The court ultimate ly m led that he was li able, because he and 
Luanne were the "Iegal parents" of Jaycee, despite a lack of biologica l 
relationship, The court reasoned that because the coupl e " intended" to 
bring about Jaycee's ex istence, and because they were the "first movers" of 
Jaycee's existence through the ir "procreati ve cond uct." they equated to 
natural parents. Con troversia ll y, the court then ordered the Buzzancas' 
names entered on Jaycee's birth certificate. deletin g Sne ll as the birth 
mother. 
California 's ri sing "interu theory" of assisted reproduction literall y 
means that couples using assisted reproductive technologies (A RT) always 
have a superi or c laim of parentage over an egg donor. spenn donor. or 
gestational surrogate, Consequentl y, intent theory in ART cases hus since 
deve loped increasing popularity among fam ily law scholars, Some argue 
Ihal the theory a ll ows infertile women to com pletely bypass the adoption 
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process and instead attain automaticall y the same status as a biological 
parent." Likewise. a homosexual couple arranging the creation of a child 
can do the same thing. so that two persons of the same sex could become 
the chi ld's "natural parents ... ·• Most disturbingly. the logical conclusion of 
intent theory guarantee!i that "intending parents" wi ll always wi n over 
biological contributors in paternity disputes. In theory. an adopting couple 
could sue for specifi c perfonmll1ce if. for example. a surrogate mother 
reneged on an agreement.~ 
This jurisprudential speculation may be premature and dangerous. 
In the exc itement over the supposedly positi ve applications o f imem 
theory, scholars may have overlooked the negati ve ones . The term "imenC ' 
inevitably brings to mind contract and property law.~ Enforcing the 
promises of up to fi ve people might be lic it but for the involvement of a 
sixth person who has 110 say in the mailer: the chi ld. whose life has been 
haggled over. bartered, and give n a j udi Cial stamp. While there has yet to 
be a five-way di spute ove r a child 's paternity. wi th the increas ing use of 
ass isted reproduct ion. the questi on is now one of when. and how we ll 
intent theory holds up when it is trul y tested. 
Thi !> article proposes that the intent theory of ART parentage is 
misplaced and dangerous. In settling future di sputes over legal parentage, 
courts and legislatures should first consistently remember the inherent 
di gnity of the child at the heart of the di spute. This article then will 
examine the flaws of intent theory in light of the meaning of human 
di gnity, and conclude that court s should seek an alternati ve means of 
resolving these di sputes. 
II. The Nature of Assisted Reproductive Technology 
Ass isted reproducti ve technologies can take several different fonns , 
many of which require more than two people. For purposes of thi s 
di scussion, they include "traditi onal" ' surrogacy arrangements. 
"gestational" arrangements. and sperm donation. 
In a "traditional" surrogacy arrangement. the mother bearing the 
child is impregnated with the sperm of the adopting father. meaning the 
birth mother is also the child's genetic mother." In a "non-traditional"' or 
"gestational" surrogacy. the mother is implanted with the fertilized egg of 
another woman, and has no genetic relationship with the child. There. the 
child 's genetic mate rial may be supplied by one or both of the indiv iduals 
intending to rai se the child {although genetic material also can be from 
anonymous donors).7 A "substitute father"' can also be used: a fert ile 
woman may be artifi cially inseminated with the sperm of a man other than 
her husband (called "heterologous" artificial insemination), also often 
anonymously.8 
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r Coupl es are thus capab le or combining any of these procedures 10 birth a child . such lhat it is now poss ibl e 10 haw up to fi ve "pare nts" of a 
c hild : <J spe rm donor. egg dono r. gestational surrogate. and two adoptive 
parents. BII:::;allca is appare ntl y a rare examp le of that combination ; 
usuall y. a sing le person has several contributi ons. For example. in one 
famolls surrogacy case. the egg donor and gestator were the same person. 
as were the sperm donor and udopti ve falher.<J 
Where the donors are known. the contracting parties o ften agree Ihat 
the donor will relinqu ish a ll parental claims to the child. Such 
arrangements are essenti all y the equi valent o f pri vate adoptions I() (Often, 
the non-gene tic parent is requ ired 10 fo rmall y adopt the child ). For 
example. a gestationa l surrogate would agree to carry the child to te rm and 
the n sun'ender her at birth . Statc~ vary on the enforceabili ty of such 
arrangeme nts: some reg ulate them by statute, others hold the m void as a 
matter of public policy. and a few still ho ld them illega l. 11 
Ill. The [m'iolability of Child Dignity 
The fi rst premise of th is artic le is that. in resolving the issue of the 
c hild 's pare nt age, the inali e nable di gnity of the chi ld in questi on must be 
respected and pro tected by the lega l system. The law cannot fo rget that the 
life of ~I child. 110t a chatte l. i ~ at the heart o f these d isputes . While thi s 
noti on should be one of common se nse . an eX<lminmion o f inte nt theory 
reveals that thi s basic respect for c hildren is now a secondary 
consideration. A brie f examination of the concept o f di gnity is therefore in 
order. 
A child 's dignity is. of course . the same notion of di gnity that applies 
to all human persons. That concept appears in the United States' 
Declaration o f Inde pe ndenceY in the Preamble of the United Nations' 
C harler. l.l and the United Nations' Uni versal Declaration of Hu man 
Ri ghts. H The Declaration of Human Rights in parti cular ho lds lhat di gnity 
vests at birth because c hildren arc considered "persons" from birth . and 
because human d ignity ex te nds to a ll persons. it must fo llow that this 
concept of inal ie nabl e dignity be longs to children as wel l. 
The conce pt o f human di gnity is unfo rtunatel y diffic ult to de fine 
prec i se l y.l ~ but is sti ll considered the source of all human ri ghts. II> Whil e 
the modern connotati on of the word is apparentl y shifting from the 
Chri stian noti on of "sacredness" to one centered on indi vidual autonomy 
instead Y the basic te rm is sti ll synonymous with the ;'inlrinsic worth" of 
the indi vidual.'8 In having intrinsic worth. human beings are an end unto 
themsel ves. It is therefo re always illi c it to use persons as a mea ns to an 
e nd l') (such as through bondage). Dignity also suggests that one person 
cannot be more " va luable" than anothe r: instead . there is substantial 
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equality hetwee n persons. or si mply: "Ench person is as good as every 
other:' ~!1 
Human di gn it y is <l Isa conside red "ina lienable," meani ng that it 
cannot be removed under any c ircumstances . no matter the method.l ! 
Govern ments th us have the power to e liminate slavery and promote decent 
human cond i tions.~~ This a lso means that while chi ldren are not fully 
capable of exerc ising thei r rights until adllltilood. and parents have the 
power to exercise rights on the ir beha l f. ~3 parent s do not and cunnot 0 11"11 
ch i ldren . ~~ Rather. the law assumes that parents are stewards of their 
children until (hey reach the ir majority. 25 
I. Human Dignity According to the Catholic Church 
The Catholic C hurch olf ers panicul arly insightful notions of human 
dignity. e5peciall y in the context of children and ART. In the eyes of the 
Church. digni ty is "rooted in [man 'sJ creat ion in the image and likeness of 
God,"2~ and therefore is inviolab le and unquesti onableY In Cellle:j illlll.',· 
AI/litts, Pope John Pau l II warned that children should not be considered 
"as one. of the many ' things' which an individual can have or not have .. 
accordi ng to taste. and which compelc with other poss i bi1 iti es."~~ T he 
statement stems di rectly frolll the notion of dignity: chi ldren do not ex ist 
for the sake of appeasing a p.lre nt's des ire to have chi ldren. El sewhere. the 
Church notes that: 
A child is not ~ome\hing owed to one. bUl is a gift. The "su preme 
gifl of marriage" is a human person. A chi ld may not be 
considered a piece or property, an idea to IYhkh an alleged "right to a 
child'· would lead. In th is area. only the child possesses genuine 
riglu s: the righl .'\0 be Ihe fruil of his parents:' and "the righl 10 be 
rest)ccled as a person from the moment of his conception:· .") 
Thtrefore. children have the right " to dc\·c1op in the mother's womb 
from the moment of conception" ,md "the right \0 li ve in a united 
family and in a moral cnviron men! conducive \0 the growth of the 
child's personality ...... ' 
These ideas arc deri ved from the not ion of human di gnity. Since children. 
as hu man persons. have di gnity. they cannot be treated as a ' ·means to an 
end: ' such as ex isti ng to appease the ir parents' desire to procreate. Rather. 
in the proper view of the family, the parents' desire to proc reate coincides 
with any chil dren born of the marriage. so that the chi ld is welcomed into 
the home. rather than viewed .1S an ex pectation . 
The moral wrong is particularly apparent fro l11 a rece nt story 
involving ART in which a deaf lesbian couple. Sharon Duchesneau and 
Candace McCullough. ill/ell/ iollall.'" genetically engineered two deaf 
children us ing sperm from a deaf donor.J ] The women c laimed that 
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deafness is an identity, not a disabili ty. and wanted their children to share in 
that identity. They reasoncd that "a hearing baby would be a bless ing: a 
deaf baby would be a spcciu l blessing. '1 and frankly stated that the 
arrangcment was their attcmpt \0 create a "prefect baby ... ·'3 
The intemional disabling of a child and ca lling it a "blessing" 
severe ly violates child dign ity to a new degrec: in the minds of the couple. 
their children are something to be prepackaged and atTJnged to satisfy fheir 
conception of a "perfect" baby who can share in the "blessin g" of deafness. 
Apparently. they ignored whether the chi/dre" wou ld reciproc'ltc that 
desire (and it will be interesti ng if these children decide to sue their parents 
in the futu re). In the parcnts' minds. the expectafioll of having a chi ld who 
could share their handicap justified the children's intentional mutilation. 
These ideas are criti cal in accounting fo r why the Church opposes 
form s of ART that separate proc reation from the conjuga l act :u Because 
ch ildren have the right to be conceived in their mothers' wombs, much of 
the prob lem is that ART using genetic material not of the persons who will 
rai se the child "infringes the child 's right to be born of:l father and mother 
known to him and bound to each other by maniage:' 15 While ART 
involving vllly a husband and wife are "less reprehensible" (such as a wife 
<l l1ifi ciall y inseminated by her husband's semen), they still ure wrong 
because, in addition to treating the child as something "owed", the act 
"entrusts the life and iden tity of the embryo into the powe r of the doctors 
and biologists and establishes the domination of technology over the origin 
and destiny of the human person." }/> 
The imporlJnce of conjugal procreati on, as opposed to artificial 
means. has been stressed by John Paul II : 
[n conjugaltovc and in tran:-miHing life. the hurn.m c<.J nnot fo rgel his 
or her digni ty as a hum'lIl person: it raises the natural order to a 
certain level. one which is no longer mere ly biological. Thai is why 
the Church te:lches that responsibility for love i). in separable fmrn 
responsibility from procreation. The biologica l phenomenon of 
human reproduction. wherei n the human person linds his or her 
beginnings. also has as its enu the emerge nce of ,I new person. unique 
and unrepealable. l1l<lde in the irn<lge and like ness of God. The 
dignity of the procreat ive act in which the interpersonal love of the 
spouses tinds in its c ulmination in the new person, in a son or 
daughter. emerges (rom thai fae!. Thai is why the Church It'';tches 
that openness to life in conjuga l relations protects the very 
authenticity of the love f(·l;uionship.17 
This stateme nt verifies why the conjugal act is a moral requirement of 
procreation. In ART techniques wbich separate the two, the effort "forces" 
the child into existence for the satisfaction of the parents' (admittedl y 
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benevolent) desires. However. in the Church's unde rstanding of marriage, 
the uni on of the coupl e in the conjugal act is meant to be "open" to the 
transmi ssion of life ;'~ so that any resultin g chi ldre n arc welcomed rathe r 
than ex peeted.Jq " No one may subject the comi ng of the child into the 
world to conditions of tec hni cal e ffi ciency which arc to be evaluated 
according to standards of control and dominion:·.J(j Whil e pare nts who 
procreate through the conjugal acl. like ART parents. ;llso mi ght desire 
children fo r the sake of sati sfying the procreati ve urge. the conjugal act 
itse lf does not vio late the c hild 's d ignity. Conjugal procreati on al ways 
operates indepe nde ntl y of the intenti on of the parents: couples can desire a 
c hild and not become pregnant . whil e o thers can take steps to avoid 
conception and still h;we pregnancy result. Ideally. the parents' intentions 
should coinc ide with the bio logical reality of the child 's conception. So. 
while pare nts' intentions mi ght offe nd the di gnity of the child . the means of 
conception should not. 
The Church considers surrogacy arra ngeme nts part ic ul arly illi cit. 
"Surrogate motherhood agree me nts. with o r without the pay me nt o f 
moncy. treat the child as a non-person . as an item of propen y to be 
di sposed of at the will of others without regard to hi s own interest. .. ~' TIli s 
state ment works in <:onjullction with the C hurch' s interpretat ion of the 
seventh commandment. whi ch " prohibits actions or enterpri ses whi ch for 
any reason- se lfi sh or ideo logical. comme rcia l or to talitari an-lead 10 the 
e nslavement of human be ings. di sreg,lrd for their pe rsonal di gnity. buying 
or selling or excha nging them li ke lllerchandi se:·J" A lt hough surrogacy 
arrange ments do no t conjure up be lligerent images o f slavery. they 
nonethe less fit the tec hnical definiti on because the sale of a child is the 
result. 
2. Posilive Law Bases of C hild Dignity 
Modern Ameri can positi ve law generally refl ects the above concepts 
of human and child digniry. It is ax iomatic that children are not prope rty. 
bUl are persons who need protection from the parent. or failin g that. the 
state.J·1 One autho r notes th at "Ia] 'child ' is a person. and not a subperson 
over whom the parent has an absolute possesso ry inte rest: a child has 
rights. too. some of w hic h are of a constitutional magniludc:·.u Likewise . 
the parent-child relationship is considered a status. ne ither a contract nor a 
property ri ght. The re lati onship is strong enough that it can onl y be altered 
in nccord with due process.J·~ "rTlhe usual view is that the ri ght cannot be 
dealt with as though it were a vested propen y ri ght. Rather, it is in the 
nature of a trust imposed on the pare nt fo r the child's be nefit : !..lt> u.s. II. 
lVieg(llld.J7 a c hild po rnography case. illustrates the imporwnce of child 
di gnity. Speaking fo r the Nimh C ircuit on why child pornograph y was 
illegal , Judge Noon an wro te : 
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f The cri me is Ihe offense against the child- the harm "to the physiological. emotional. and men tal health" of lhe child.. the 
"psychological h:lrm" .. the invasion of the child's 
··vu lnerabilit{· ... These h:lrntS co llectively arc the consequential 
damages Ihat now from the trespass agains t the dign ity of \hl.' chi ld. 
Any photograph makes its human subject an objet!. No offense \0 
human dignity is done. The pornographic pholOgrapher subordinates 
the humanity of his subject 10 the sexuality of the subject. The 
humanity of the subject is not el imin:lIcd: how could il be ? Indeed 
the interest of the pomogmph('1' is in the human person treated as a 
sexual object. From a femi ni st perspective. th is reduction of 
humanness has been seen as a male otTcnse ... Bul whether the person 
is mllle or fellmlc. the essential opermio n is the same : lin assllu lt upon 
the humanity of the perso n pictured. making Ihat person a mere 
means serving Ihe voyeuf·s purposes ... Human dignity is offended 
by the pornogrJpher. American 1:tW does not prolect :111 hum:m 
dignity; legally, an adul t ca nnot cOllsentlO its diminishment. When a 
child is made the target of the pornographer-photognlphcr. the statute 
will not suffer the insult to the human spiri t. that the ch ild shou ld be 
treated as a Ihing .~" 
At least onc court has also reflectcd the idea that a chi ld is not 
··owed'· to an indi vidual. even in light of the constitutional righ t to 
procreation. In the famous DC/by M case. part orlhe court· s justifi cation for 
voiding the surrog:Ky contract was its view that 
Itlhe right 10 procreate very simply is lhe right to have natural 
chi ldren. whether Ihrough sexual intercourse or anificilll 
inseminatio n. It is no more than Ihal. The custody. care, 
companionship. and nunuring that fo llow birth are not parts of the 
right 10 procreation; they arc rights thaI may also be const itutionally 
protected. but that involve considerations other than the right of 
procreation.~* 
While not passing judgment on ART per se. clearly the court was opposed 
to the notion that tile chi ld was a ··thing·' somehow owed to either of lhe 
panics based on their right to procreate. 
Ult imately. the issue of human and ch ild dignity by itself does not 
answer the question of who the proper parents are in ART di spu tes. Rather, 
dignity acts as a gu ide line on how the law shou ld 1101 act: that is, the law 
must ensure that the child's dignity, already damaged as a product of Art, is 
not violated any further. The chi ld shou ld never be objectified. but shoul d 
be considered a rea l party in interest whose future and identity are at lhe 
heart of the di spute. Whi le dignity impl ies [hat any determi nation of 
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parenthood mi ght be acceptable. it docs ex plicitl y mean thai a theory based 
on contract or property is illicit. 
IV. Critiquing Intent Theory in Light of Human Dignity 
A. Origins of Intent Theory 
I . Jol"'.w lt I'. Cutrert 
Popul ar application of the intelll iheory of parentage has its origins in 
l ohnSOIl \'. C(/h'(!I"f.!O a 1993 Californ ia case. Mark and Crispina Ca lvert 
were unable to benr chi ldren, and contracted with Anna Johnson to be 
implanted with an embryo conceived from the Ca lverts' gametes. Shol11y 
after implantat ion. the parti es' re lationship deteriorated, and Johnson 
threatened to keep the child unless full pay ment was made. The C llve rts. 
in turn . sued for a declaration that they were the legal parents: Johnson 
coumersued for a similar declaration. 
The problem. according to (he cou rt . was that Califo rn ia a llowed 
either blood or birth as suffi cient proof of maternity. The relevant stat ute's 
language was permissive. using terms such as "may" and '·or." which the 
court viewed as creati ng equall y persuasive alternati ves between blood and 
birth . Even the old adage. I/Ulla l'st qllom gestatio demollsfral (by 
gestation the mother is demonstrated) suggested to the court that "while 
gestation may demonstrate maternal slalUS. it is not the sill e q lla 11011 of 
motherhood. Rather. it is poss ible that the cOlll mon law viewed gene tic 
consanguinity as the basis for materna l rights."s, 
The court resolved this apparent confli ct by relying all the parties' 
intentions, holdi ng that "when the two means do not coincide in one 
WOt11<lI1 . she who intended to create the child- this is. she who intended to 
bri ng about the birth of the chi ld that she intended to raise as ber own- is 
the natura l 1ll00 her under Californ ia l aw."~~ Its rat ionale was based 
primarily on the theories of Professors HitPJ and Shultz.:\.! It fi rst appl ied 
Hi ll's theory of "but-for causation": " tbe child would not have been born 
but for the efforts of the intended parents ... The intended parents are the 
fi rst cause. or the prime movers. of the procreative re lationship."5s It 
simi larly re lied on Professor Shultz's be lief that ·'the mental concept of the 
child is the controll ing factor of its creation. and the originators of that 
concept merit fu ll credit as conceivers."'16 
The JoIIII ,wJII majority also re lied 0 11 Professor Shultz's be lief lhal 
" Iw ]ithin the context of artilicia l reproduct ive tec hnolog ies ... inte ntions 
that are voluntaril y chosen. delibe rate. express and bargained-for ought 
presumptive ly to dete rmi ne legal paremhood."57 Li tt le was said on this 
part icular point. alt hough Hi ll's article offe red simil ar comments that 
furt her expla in tbe rationale. Hi ll's thi nking is W0I1h repeati ng in full : 
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ITlhe gestational host and genetic progeni tors should be held 10 
their origi nal promises not to seek any parental ri gills in the child . . 
the deol1lological ."Irain hold~ Ihat people generally should be held to 
their promi ses simply bccauSl' promise keeping is good in itself. TIl(." 
predicament or the intended pare nts is poignant precisely becau)'c the 
surrogate's pmmise is the very basis for her involvement in the 
procreative relationshi p in the ti rsl place. Absent a commitment on 
her pan. the intended parents could seek the assistance of another. 
BUI where the gestational host. or the genetic progenitor. . . 11:15 
gained access to the procreative relfltionship initiated by another. ~he 
~hould not be permitted the double inj ustice of reneging and. JllOTe 
imponantly. retaining custody of the chi ld. 
The consequcntiali st 5tr:Jin of this argument emphasizes the 
reliance of the intended parents upon the promi se of other panics in 
the procreative relationship. The intended parents rely. both 
linancially and emotionally. to their detriment on the promi~e of the 
biulog ical progeni tors and gestational hosl. They rel y finant" ially by 
puTt' hasing lhl.' material essenli;lls of t"hild-rearing . including baby 
fumiture . dOlhl.'s. toys. and other accessories. They may even move 
or expand their home to accommodate the new arrival . If the promi se 
of the other panil.'s were not enforl·eable. the intended parents could 
not make these preparations without the po~s ibility of losing their 
invesllnent . 
More imponantly. the imendcd parents rely emotion.tlly on thc 
promi ses of the others to refrain from claiming paremal rights in the 
child. They rcly by preparing themselves psychologit"a lly for 
parenthood and all that it entai ls. They also rely emotionally to the 
extent that they have interacted with the surrogate and anticipated the 
binh of the ch i ld. s~ 
The two interrehlled concerns essentially revolve around contractual 
reliance: that the intended parents' ex peClations Illust be mel. and that the 
geneti c or gestational contributors must be prevented from reneging. 
Another aut hor complains that the genetic basis does not "address the 
seriolLs problem of providing an adequate remedy for abuses in the 
barga ining process between pan ies involved in assisted reproductive 
aml11 gements:'~'1 
Addi tionally. the COUll al so re lied on Shu lt z'S notion that "the 
in terests of children ... are unlikely to rlln contrary 10 those of adult s who 
choose to bring them into being."611 The in ference is that the contracting 
parents' desire to rai se a chi ld is indicative of their responsibility and 
parenti ng ability.lt l Th is rule supposed ly would "promote certainty and 
stabili l), for the child ... It~ 
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2. flaws in the )01111$011 Opinion 
Althou2.h the resuh or Jolll1sOIl is in line with this notc 's theories. the 
reasoning is severely flawed. as ex pl<1ined by di sse nting Justice Kennard.o1 
Kennard first observed that "but-for" causation is prope rl y applied in tort 
law. but even the ll . California applied a "substantial factor" test in 
causati on. He conceded that the intending mother was. of course. a 
"substantial factor" in the child 's creati on. butlhe theory was "misplaced" 
because, in reality, "[bJoth the genetic and the gestational mothers are 
indispensable to the binh of a ehild. ().I illustrating that in the ART process. 
all parties make apparently equal contributions, This is specificall y 
apparent where an intended parent screens the potential candidate for 
spec ific qualities (i.e .. the genes of a person with specific qualiti es. such as 
appearance, talent. o r race) . In such cases . the geneti c parents' 
contribution is heightencd because the contracting parcnt seeks a particu lar 
type of person. maki ng the gamete donor's contribution even more 
··substantial." 
Justice Kennard directl y di scusses the prim;iples of child di gnity in 
hi s criti cism of the "origi nators of concept'" rati onale of the majority. He 
illustrates that the source of thi s reasoning was from inte llectual property 
law: the idea lhat "nn idea belongs to its creator because the idea is a 
manifestat ion of the creator'S personality or self."6~ As Kennard correct ly 
stated, the logical end of this rationale is that the child must be conside red 
the property of the intending parent. This treatment of children as property 
is antithetical to society'S understand ing uf children and family. There is a 
manifest inappropriateness in applying th is rati onale in order to reach 
} ohnw}// 's result : it means lhat the child is a thing properl y owed to one 
party or another. 
The same fault can be found with the " re liance" rati onale ad vocated 
by Professors Shultz and Hill and the Jolmson majority. It is irrelevant that 
the ART contract is voluntary. express. de liberate. ;md bnrgained for. If the 
contract were enforceable. the on ly real remedy is spec ific pe rformance. 
the subject of which is the life of a child."" Aga in . this theory is highl y 
inappropriateY as it treats the child as a means offulfilling the ends sought 
by the parents. Hill's above passage is revealing: the concern is primari ly 
for the contracting parents' linancial and emotional investment. rather than 
the child 's we ll being. It is a gross violation of di gnity to lreat the child as 
a placebo to ease the contracti ng parents' loss. The child is not a party to 
the contract. but instead the subject of it. Of course. the law rarely allows a 
non-signatory 10 be bound to a contract. and there is no reason to treat a 
child born of ART any differently. 
Wh ile people normall y should be held 10 the promises Ihey make . 
thi s in no way means that contract law is always cOlltroll ing.6k It is 
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r axiommic Ihm the law can declare certai n contracts vo id for unconsc io nabi lity. If contract ultimate ly con trols ART disputes. then wh.1I 
is the lilllit to contract enfo rceme nt ? A purely contractual view of fami ly 
law, regarding the fate of persons. raises questi ons about where it stops. It 
ri sks limiting the world to Justi ce Holmes' classic posi tivist noti o n o f 
contract law tlm1 "all contracts are fOfmal. land] that the making of a 
contract depends nOI on the agreement of two minds in o ne in tentio n. but 
0 11 the agreement o f two sets of ex ternal signs: 'I>'J If the pre~bi rth sa le of a 
child can be enforced. what prevents it after binh? What prevents suits for 
specific pe rformance of abOil ion o r prostituti on '? In thi s regard. intent 
theory canno t reconcile itself. If the contracting parents were proven the 
natural parents. the n a kidnapping charge mi ght be far more effecti ve and 
appro priate than a property theory. 
What thi s c ri tici sm really calls for is a claim fo r re li ance damages. If 
the iruending parents have honestly made large ex penditures in reli ance on 
the delivery of a chi ld , the n re imbursement for thai qualllifiabl e reliance 
mi g ht not be unju st. )(! The lim it is for the COLIrts to detem,ine, so long as it 
fall s short o f spec ifi c performance in de li very of the chi ld . Professor 
S hu ltz's advocacy fo r comract e nfo rceability and Professor Hill's "prime 
mover" argu ment fai l to add ress chi ldren's rig hts and interes t s . ~ 1 muc h less 
their dignity. 
The fin al argument. that the intent to parent is indicative o f fitness. 
also fail s for two reasons: it is bot h inflexibl e and speculative. Justice 
Kennard agreed with the majority Ihat a rule seeking to protect the child's 
interests should be paramount: hi s complaint. however. is that the rul e 
makes an infl ex ible presumption for the contracting parentsY He foresaw 
cuses of substance abuse, in stabili ty, economic ch'lIlge. and so on in the 
homes of the contracti ng parents, wh ile the ho me of the parents deni ed 
custody would be a rea li stically beller e nvironment. Hi s ana lysis 
illustrates another problem of A RT agreemen ts: s ince {hey often amount to 
the equi valent o f private adoptio ns. they occur o utside the watc hful eye of 
state supervisio n. Thus. there may be no means of knowing whether the 
indi vidual s to who m the chi ld is bei ng surrende red really are fit to parent. 
In adoptio ns. the state should be present througholll the process " to protect 
the integrity of the adoption process by which the child's ri ght to support. 
management. and care may be re-estab li shed in rel ation to an adopti ve 
parent .";·\ In ART arrangements. the slate has no presence unt il a problem 
arises. So. whi le A RT allows parents to conveni ent ly override the red tape 
of the adopt io n process.14 those barriers do exi st in order to protect the 
chi ld's safety. 
The re lated problem is in declaring inte nt as indicative o f fitness; 
while perhaps intuitive. it is ultimately specul ative. How do we know that 
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tbe intended parents' intentions wi ll not run contrary to the child's best 
interests? One author points out that 
the intent to palent does nOl guarantee the ability In parent. A woman 
is not miraculously invested with parenti ng skills j ust because she 
wishes to parent. even when she has expended time and effon 10 
accomplish Iwr desires. Commissioning ~ouples in assisted 
reproduction. and adoptive parents. who make extensive em.m to 
hccome p'lrent s. are hardly more righteous than the rest o f the 
popu lat i on. 7~ 
Additionally, at least one case of an ART-conceived chi ld kill ed by his 
adopt ive parents7b illustrales that '"intended" parents are not 
insumtaneously fi t parents because of thcir intent . 
Thc moral danger in ART cases shown by J OIIIISOIl is that parcnthood 
is '"crea1.ed· ' through contract. rather than as a social and legal relation. As 
one aluhor notes. a status-based theory of parentage impl ies obligariolls on 
a Illoralleve l, or. fa iling that. a legal requirement that those obligations be 
fullill ed.n The source of obligat ions in a pu rely contractual view of 
parentage is more ditTicult to pin point. As a result. inten t theorisls should 
not be surpri sed lhat people like John Buzzanca7~ or homosexual partners 
of genet ic parents of ART children7'} wan t out of their parental obligations, 
pointing to their lack of biological connection as eliminating any 
obligation to the child. While a paternity suit in such cases might be 
cnforceable, the fact that these suits and their defenses mise should shock 
no one in a worl d where the view of fam ily is shift ing from status to 
contract. 
3. It, re Buzzum·u 
The facts of Bllzwnca were di scusscd in Part I. above. As stated, the 
California appeals court declared John and Luanne to be the lawfu l parents 
of Jaycee, making John li able fo r child support. The result was reached by 
a clever judiCial sleight-of-hand, relying on Jolll/.wI/'s determination that 
Cal ifo rni a's patern ity law '"may" allow for paternity to be determined by 
several means. Ilone of which expl ici tl y relied upon genetics. It also relied 
upon statutes that allowed paternity to be established by seve ral non-
genetic means. suc h as marrying the child 's mother before birth , 
consenting to being named as a fa thcr on a child 's birth ce rtili cate. or 
consenting 10 the mt ificial insemination of one's wife. The court therefore 
analogized the Buzzancas' situation to that contemplated by the artifi cia l 
insemination statute: " ... both contemplate the procreation of a child by the 
consent to a medica l procedurc of someone who intends to raise the child 
but who othenvise does not have any biologicaltic.'·oo The cOLIn believed 
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r that the spirit of the Jaw warranted the ex tension of paterni ty 10 John Buzzzanca as we ll: the fact dUll Luanne did nOl give birth was irrelevant. The court observed that a simple estoppel theory wou ld have been 
sufficien t to ensure John 's paternity: however. it took the theory a step 
further so it could al so declare Luanne to be the lawful mothe r. It likened 
Luanne to "il husband in an artificial insemination case whose consent 
triggers a medical procedure which results in a pregnancy and eventua l 
birth or a ch i ld ." ~ ' That is. just ;IS a husband could be declared a fat her by 
consenting 10 insemi nation. so cou ld a mOlher because "there is .... no 
reason 10 di stinguish between husbands and wives. B01h are equall y 
sit uated from the point of view of consenting to an act whi ch brings a child 
into be ing,"~~ That. combined with Luannc's inte nt to be Jaycee' s mother, 
and the fac t that no other party attempted to cla im custody, made her the 
" intended" mothcr under l olll/Mm, TIle court be li eved that public poli cy 
encouraged thi s dec ision: the establi shment of patern ity wou ld prevent the 
taxpayers from paying for the child 's care, Add itionally, Luanne 's 
maternity necess itated thai John be ass igned paternit y: his " procreat ive 
conduc t:' albei t aJ1ifi cia i. made him just as liable as an unintended father 
who e ng'lged in casual sex , Controversially, the court then declared that 
the Buzzancas' names should appear on Jayceee's birth cc]1ificale , 
4, Flaws in th e BlI u a"cll Opinion 
Althuugh thert: is ILO queslioll lhelt lhe OUI(;Ollle o f BIIC .lIII(:lI was 
correct. the caurfs method of reaching it s conclusion is even more 
confusing than lolli/soli 's, While the dec ision establi shed John and 
Luanne as Jaycee's parents, it fa ils 10 spec ify exact ly what kind of parents 
they are beyond a vague " lawfu)" ' delemlination, Are they " natural"' 
parents? T he fact that the ir names were e ntered on the birth certifi cate is 
strong ev ide nce that the court intended thi s result , yet it re mai ns <l lega l 
fi cti on that Luanne wi ll someday have to explain to her "daughter: ' 
A like ly explanation ro r the court 's ruling was thm the dec ision was 
outcome-determinative; aner all. the enti re nature or the dispute was 
whether patemi ty o bl igati ons were e nrorceable against John, and Ihe 
determini ng parentage was onl y .. secondary issue, The court 's repealed 
concem- that if Joh n we re correct. Jaycee would be an orphan and stale 
ward- furthe r suggests Ihat the court ' s goal was finding any way to 
enforce John 's obl igation, 
A repeated concern raised by inte nt theori sts is Ihat, in favorin g 
bio logy over inte nt. people like John Buzzanca wi ll have an escape to 
avoid paternal responsibilityY The result , as the BIlZZ{/I1 ClI court feared, is 
that ART-children would beco me state wards and taxpaye r burdens, The 
hean or the matter is that a c hild has been brought into the world through 
technology and then abandoned by an indi vidua l who unexpected ly 
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wanted out of the contract. In tenn s of equlty. the decision makes sense: 
Jaycee herse lf (and Lua nne on her behalf) had a strong relia nce cla im 
against John . That is, John's so-called " procreative conduct" creates 
re liance on Jaycee 's part that she would have a fat her fi gure to prov ide her 
with support. Thi s is illustrated by John's signing of tbe contract two 
weeks aflcr implanl:.l ti on: although John actuall y signed the contract two 
weeks after implantation. the coun correc tl y he ld the written instr ument 
mere ly ratified an oral agreement. 
All BU:":"lIllc a did was to advocate th e already-ex isti ng "equitable 
parent" or "equitable adoption" doctrine , Because John assumed the soc ial 
role of a parent vis-a-vis Jaycee, he cou ~d have been estopped from 
denying lega l paternity.K4 Th is rule ex isted before intent theory. so 
pragmat ically. " intent" covers anything new, In fact. viewing the decision 
as one of equity exposes a major fl aw of intent theaI)'. As mentioned 
above. some intent ad vocates believe that the ru le guarantees stabi lity for 
the child. since the intent of parents is unl ike ly to nm contrary to the chi ld 's 
interests. 8~ Cases li ke B U1.:..(IIICli show otherwise. Real istica lly. a child 's 
interests incl ude not just financia l support from a parent. but also 
emoti onal suppon and soc ial and mora l guid;ance . Intent theory, despite its 
cl aim. fa il s to prevent the problem of deadbe,at parents. At best. thi s theory 
only imposes a fi nancia l obl igation to the c hi ld via the equitable parent. 
Hence. John Buzzanca is nO! socially a father to Jaycee. but only a 
ti nanc ial supplier. and bas sworn never to be a fat her in any pract ica l 
sense,86 While one author compla ins that these children "(Ire then le ft ill 
limbo as to the ir parentage as well as the ir fi nancia l suppon ."~7 intent 
theory ensures only the latter. leaving the fo rmer sti ll in question. 
So why did the 8 11:..::,(lI/c (/ court go beyond a mere theory of equity? 
Like ly, it d id so because it was the only way the coun could declare 
Luanne's mate rnity. The courts had a lready du g a prove rbial hole by 
all owing the case to proceed fo r three years. during wh ich Luanne and 
Jaycee undoubted ly bonded as a famil y. ss It would be a strange dec ision if 
i/lvo llll/lary paternity could be declared agai nst John , bu t 1101Il/l/(//,Y 
pate rnity could not be granted to Luanne (Such a result mi ght also Illcan 
thai John , as a lawful parent. coul d remove Jaycee from Luanne. the 
unl awful parent. at his di scretion.). It is possib le that the circumstances 
and elongated litigation left the coun no practical choice by which to 
guarantee Luanne's mutcrnity. 
The problem is that the declaration was a complete legal fi ction. 
How thi s theory will play out in future i:itigation (fo r example. if (I II 
potential donors silll uitaneously sued for custody) mi ght revea l 
problematic resul ts. In the short lenn . BU:":"(lJ/ca Illay have safeguarded the 
soc ial fu nction of the family, as one author suggests. !!<J Bu t the coun 's 
theory also undenn ines the traditional famil y in three respects. According 
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to Professor Rad hika Rao. " the ideology of fami ly law is premised upon 
the e thos of ahrui sm:""qO that is. that the family is supposed to be. founded 
on love and affection. in polar opposit ion to market forces . whi ch are based 
on autonomy and arms- length transactions.91 Rao admits that thi s is a fal se 
dichotomy: the family and market have always shared functions. and ART 
ex poses thi s fac t :}~ Regardless of whether the fam il y does have a 
commercial basis. the perspective has frightening implications. By 
viewing famil y as a contract, rather than a status. it again undermines the 
sense of obliglltiull tied to famil y. She notes Ihal e liminating biology 
bri ngs the famil y closer 10 a world of pure private orderingy1 The potentia l 
result is that famil ial commitments "become both contingen t and 
revoc;'lble ... IPlaren thood by consent may encourage the att itude that 
fami ly relati onships can be freely entered and exited. accepted or 
rejecled:" }~ Third. Rao notes Ihat by making biology irre levant to ART 
parents. il makes biology irrelevant to everyone: biology is no longer 
suffi cien t or necessary even for tradiliolla/ biolog ical parents." 5 Rao's 
reasoni ng suggesls that parents of sexuall y conce ived children now have 
further incentive to j ustify a lack of obl igation to their children. If 11011-
genetic ART parents such as John Buzzanca can free ly abandon paternity 
and be liable on ly for finance s, what stops traditional biologica l paren ts 
from doing the same'?,'" A grow ing argument is thaI. under Roe 1'. mule, a 
putative fathe r is all owed to escape responsibilities for a child j ust as a 
mother can through abol1ion. 'I7 The contractual view of fam ily inevitab ly 
creates such derivative result s. 
If "intent" delellllines parentuge in ART cases. whal prevents intent 
from being the paradigm of parenthood in every case? This view mi ghl 
have little impact on most families. since most ""intended" parents are also 
the biological parents of their children. However. deJiIlCjuell1 or 
i ,uu/J'erlelll fathers theoretically could claim a lack of in tent. The theory 
otherwise creales an odd inconsistency: why impose liabi lity on a natural 
fa ther who den ies responsib ility. yet deny paternity 10 an indi vidual who 
seeks to embrace it? (This could also impact a naluralmolher's abi lity to 
revoke her consenl to her chi ld' s adoption: the law cou ld extend "intent"" 
even further to declare that a couple who intends to adopt a child shouldn't 
be denied specitic performance.) BII:.zaIlC{/ likened itse lf to Slt'pliell K. 1'. 
Roni L..'I!l in which a man who reli ed upon a fal se statement Ihal hi s sexual 
partner was using bi rth control piUs could not bring a c lai m of fraud against 
her after she became pregnant. It suggests thaI. in order to keep Bu::al/{.:a 
consistent with SIf!plien K. type cases. application of intent theory should 
be limited sole ly to ART di sputes. wh ich is a more sensible result . 
Theorists argui ng that intent is the paradigm of all parenwge have nol 
explained bow a case like Stephen K. can be reconciled with the theory. 
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B. Other Justifications (or I ntent Theory. and Responses 
Another rationale for intent theory is that it creates certainty in the 
detennination of a child' s parents. so her identity is not in "Iimbo" duri ng 
litigation .'19 The rationale exists for two reasons: first. it discourages 
biological parents fro m suing: second. it supposedl y protects the ch ild 's 
identity.II~) This concept, wh ile appealing. is still unpersuasive: legal 
effic iency is no rea~on to prevent a suit. particularly where one party might 
justly be the proper parent. On the iiI'S! point, lawsuits may streamline the 
legal process. but it fails to preve nt all lawsuit's. and ignores thm a beller 
theory of biological parentage may yet exist. The argument agai n 
presupposes that intent theory is the correct paradigm. and does not 
address the theory 's merits. The argument also applies [Q allY model of 
parentage: if the presumption favored biological parents. the "bright-line" 
certainty of a predictable result in liti gation wi ll rema in . 
The second rationale-the protection of the child 's idemity- might 
be more meritorious, since protecting the child 's sense of self is a poor 
outcome. However. the "protection" wi ll probably onl y amount to a 
delaying tactic, since the child will inevitably di scover her ART origi ns and 
still have her sense of self impacted. TIle "certainty" of paternity is also the 
theory 's weakness-it speaks little of the chi ld's best interestsYIi It is 
therefore hollow: intent only guarantees outcome. not well-being. 
A confused and ultimate ly non-sequitur argument is that ART 
arrangements must be enforced because to do otherwise violates a 
woman's fundamenta l ri ght to contract. According to one advocate. 
"[pJrohibiting women from free ly en tering into contracts, or any type of 
deal. demeans them:'IU~ Obviously, women have thi s right, and no rat ional 
jurist can question that. The rationale's flaw is its breadth: it assumes that 
contract and free choice supercede any other consideration. The author 
ignores that some contracts are unenforceable on public policy grounds. 
such as illegality and unconscionabili ty. If women really have an unl imited 
right to contract. does {his mean that a client for prosti tution can demand 
specitic performance? Can an abonioni st do the same once a woman signs 
a consent form ? H a woman freely contracts to sell a limb. and then 
reneges, shou ld the law enforce it ? 
This argument takes a question of conscience and answers with eq ual 
protection , dodging tbe original issue. It unfairly delllalld.~ that women 
stand by a potentiall y unconscionable contract just to prove a point about 
gender equality. Even if equal protection is a legitimate concern . !lana 
Hurwitz's response is better. She notes that "[tJo exerc ise a change of he an 
is both financially and emotionally costly for a surrogate ... [SJurrogates 
who change their minds. despite the inordinate ri sks, demonstrate the 
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autonomy and fonilude of women, nOllhe ir supposed frailli cs ."Ii\.l 
This " ri ght to contrac t" also fail s to answer the moral question of 
child selling or comracts invo lving children. The argumem di ct:.lIes that 
contract is always the morall y controll ing factor.10-1 but a pure contract 
theory ignores that the child 's future is being predetermined by financial 
exchange. So whil e intent theory mi ght strengthen women' s fundamenta l 
rights, it severely impacts those of lhe children involved. 
A related argument is that indi vidual s entering ART contracts do so 
with fu ll realization of the consequences. such as medical ri sks and 
emotional costS. 105 This theory points to the fact that many genetic 
contributors already have child ren of their own. and are therefore prepared 
for the ex perience of slmendering a ch ild Ylb The fl aw here is that while 
iment is a basic requ irement of contract law. as the court complained in 
Belisro I'. Clark, intent can be hard to prove .. Hl7 FW1hermore, intent can 
challge as the genetic contributor rea li zes the magnitude of the contract. 
One au thor argues: "Inntentions concernin g: parenthood before a cbild 
comes imo being are not required to be stable or fixed ." I01! This is apparent 
from women who change their minds abollt g iving up a child for adoption 
or having an abortion. Ill'! The facl is that "'people's in tentions are rarely uni-
dimensional or everlasting, and it is rarely possible to identify a person's 
one, true intent ."llo Even a surrendering parent who has previollsly given 
birth may not realize the consequences of giving away a child in contract. 
"Given the changes in feeling that we know frequentl y occur. and that we 
generall y wan t to occur, during pregnancy and at birth , the informed 
voluntariness of the cboice to give up the chUd is at its peak when made 
with fu ll awareness of the pain entailed- ·aFter the child comes into 
being."111 Therefore. a lack of undue inO uence, duress, or coercion in ART 
contracts is irrelevant , since some unconsc ionable contracts can be entered 
wit bout those factors. 
Furthermore. if the complaint is that some genetic contributors 
already have children is taken to mean "so why do they need more?," then 
the statement is unfair. The logicul extens ion of the rationale is that 
children arc Ulilitarian commoditi es. and that the bil1h of some children 
decreases the need for more. The argument makes the genetic purent 
appear to have less necessity for that particul ar child. whil e the contracti ng 
parem has more necessit y for the child. Tbe intent argument creates 
roundabout sympalhy for the intended rec ipients. Regard less, sympathy 
for the unfortunate infel1ilily of those persons does not entitle them to a 
child as a social remedy. This argumenl recalls the importance of continual 
re-emphasis of the child 's ind ividual dignity. Even one intent theorist 
admits that "'[e lmotions concerning parenthood are sufficiently predictable 
and of such a transfonning nature Ihal any a(lempt to reduce them to the 
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four comers of a comract seriously undermines the profound experience of 
creating life: ' I1~ 
The central basis for the contract model may be. as one author 
claims. an underlying assumption that the human body is one's property 
and therefore a freely transferable good. IU According 10 Kennit Roosevelt. 
since many courts now recogni ze property ri ghts in gametes. parental 
rights should be delemlined by who has property right s in the reproducti ve 
material when gestation begins:14 in other words. parental ri ghts arc 
derived from property ri ghI'S. 
Roosevelt·s argument admittedl y has more merit. since he creatively 
relocates where parental rights vest. Effectively. he concedes the power of 
biology. but does so by stating thai gametes are as transferable as blood. 
skin . and organs. If an egg is transferred from one woman 10 another. it 
becomes the second woman' s egg. The problem is that Rooseve lt never 
exactly states from where he makes the detennination that the body is 
transferable 10 begin outside of a vague belief that ''["w ]ithollt any property 
ri ghts in the body. we would have the odd result that others have as much 
claim to our bodie3 as we do." II ! He may have merely assumed the 
assessment for the sake of hi s argument. But even assuming that the body 
is property. Roosevelt ·s argument is Ihat palernir), is free ly transferable . 
Things are certainly marketable. but neither a child nor a status can be 
treated the same way. The President of the United States cannot sell hi s job 
title. A parent cannot se ll the fact that he is genetically related to someone. 
There is something disturbi ng about me body being a property 
interesL as Roosevelt himself admits. fIt• The language is inappropriate. as 
it suggests that the human body is somehow separate from the human 
person. The source of these propell y rights is not ex plai ned. unless it is 
just some strange incidence of birth that one is bom with the body thm one 
owns. The resulting question is whether one could theoreti cally sell his 
entjre body. and if so. whether the law must enforce that contract. 
Roosevelt notes thaI the 13th Amendment's prohibition of slavery renders 
one's rights in the body inalienable.1I7 So even if property ownership 
detennincs the relationshi p of the body to the person. our betler sense 
suggests that there must be logical and moral limits to the ability (0 transfer 
one's body. Hence. a contract fo r prostit ution or aborti on must be 
unconditionally voidable by the person with the so-called property interest 
in the body. 
This must also be true with ART. Since the transfer of both patemity 
and a child is involved. this would also be a case where the conlract must 
be voidable. Even Roosevelt admits that the transfer of patern ity and 
children are illegal and void: hi s solution "cheats" the illegality by moving 
the line of where pmemity vests. Others frankly admit that the nolion of 
" famil y" must be expanded in order to make the intent argument 
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errective. !l~ Again. the problem is that lingui stic manipulation cannot 
overcome t:l c tual and biological rea lity. Putting the Buzzancas' names on 
Jaycee's birth certifi cate does not make them her natural parents.1I9 The 
effol1 is di sturbingly similar to the belief of Winston. the protagonist of 
Orwell's 1984. Ihat reality ex ists entirely within the mind. as determined 
by the stute .I !O These theories do the same thing: they alter the reality of 
paternity in order to escape the moral and legal prohibition of child sell ing 
by mguing that no sale ever happened. 
Even if iluenL theori sts be lieve that intent is a mere termi nology used 
in parentage determinations. and no t a con tract. the problem is that contract 
law must inevitably be applied in these disputes. That application. of 
course. violates a chi ld's dignity by it s vCI)' nature. One author's criticism 
is very revc;:tling: 
In the end. the notion of intent cannot renect and preserve 
autonomous individuality :tnd. at the same time. provide proof (as a 
substitute for biological "facts" such as blood and genes) of the 
enduri ng essence of fami1i;LI love and loya lty. Jud icial reliance on 
iment in e;l:<;es such as Jvhnsoll will prove impractical or will be 
expressly transformed inlo a more straightforward reliance on 
ordinary t'ontract principles.' l ' 
FUl1her11l0re. as explained above. intent fail s to entertain seriollsly the 
interes t s.!~~ much less the dignity. of the child . Marsha Garri son very 
succi nctl y describes the problem: 
Given that our legal tradition precludes per se enforcement of :Ill 
contrac l ~ concerni ng children. a proposal 10 grant per se enforcement 
to a single contract subset should be supponed by a detennination 
that this group is sufficiently different from the remai nder to justify 
incons istent treat men! . or in the event that the governing ad vocate is 
will ing 10 ex tend per se enforcement to all cOlliracts governing 
ch ildren's care and status.:I showing that thi s approach is preferrablc 
\0 thc tradi tional one. ':) 
Until intent theori sts can make such a showing , inte nt theory will 
ineviwbly collapse upon its own shaky fou ndat ion. 
VI. Conclusion 
Thi s article began by reaffirming that, when a c hild has bee n created 
through ass isted reproductive tec hnologies. the primary and con tinual 
considerati on of the law shou ld be maintaining the chi ld's inalie mtble 
d igni ty. While the very use of ART consti tutes a signifi cant violation of the 
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chi ld's d ignit y, the violation need nOI continue. The law cannot undo what 
has happened. but can ensure that the child 's future is restored to its proper 
path. 
Thi s article hm; also illustnlled why " intent thcory:' the increasing ly 
popular paradigm of parent'lge . is incorrect. Inten t theory ultimately acts 
as a contractual model of parenthood thai half,heartedly attempts to protect 
traditional no tions of children. parents. and the family. The theory treats 
chi ld ren as fungible property and the famil y as a contractual re lationship 
that can be freely ex ited. In Ihe long term. thi s theory wi ll do more ham1 
than good to the social funct io n of the fa mil y. It impropc rl y chunges the 
family from a status to a contract. thereby eliminating much of the moral 
va lue of the relationship. Thi s article has de monstrated that even the most 
meritorious rationales for intcnt theory ultimately fail to create a proper 
model of the famil y or to protect human dignity. While another theory 
favoring " intended" parems might be more acceptable. inten t theory in its 
current form is unable to do so. 
Lawyers, couns, leg is lato rs. and most importantly, pare nts, should 
be wary of these considerations in the future . As Buw lllca indicated. 
" ftlhese cases will not go away." The law must prepare to reaffil1l1 that 
which made the family slic h a lasting insti tution. 
The aliI hoI' wishes 10 Ihal/k hi.\· parellts. classmates. with particular thal1ks 
to Jolm Mallos. Jasol/ Negri. Josh llo Skilll/t'I; Robert Klllcik. MOll ica L. 
Secord. and Aile Maria Profe~':'iOn; Richard M.vers alld Jane Ado/pile. 
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